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A B S T R A C T
This introductory article to the special issue on the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) framework presents an
overview of the latest developments of the framework. The IRR framework has been established as an important
supplement to existing (neo)institutional approaches focusing on the management of natural resources. One of
the major contributions of the IRR framework is its ability to appraise the institutional complexity of hetero-
geneous resource use situations at the nexus of public regulatory actions and private responses, to link the
resulting institutional arrangements with claimants’ access to the resource, and to propose causal mechanisms
explaining the relationship between institutions and sustainability.
1. Introduction
After 20 years of existence and continuous development, the
Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) framework has been established as
an important supplement to existing (neo)institutional approaches fo-
cusing on the management of natural resources (Aubin, 2007; de Buren,
2015; Gerber et al., 2009; Knoepfel et al., 2001, 2007; Bolognesi and
Nahrath, 2020). The IRR contributes to the understanding of the in-
stitutional and political dimensions of resource governance. Common-
pool resources (“commons”) refer to a form of resources that are pre-
valent but particularly challenging to regulate: uses are competitive,
leading to potential degradation, but users are difficult to exclude
(Ostrom, 1990). As such, they have received a lot of attention by
scholars. Many analyses of common-pool resources have focused on the
regulation of homogeneous use situations (e.g., the literature on fish-
eries, forestry and aquifers). Due to their simplicity, these settings have
facilitated the development of relatively simple models (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992). However, an analytical framework that aims to un-
derstand a more representative range of resource uses must be capable
of portraying the complexity of heterogeneous use situations (Steins
and Edwards, 1999). Despite being highly challenging to appraise,
these situations are also the most common. The IRR framework aims to
follow a realistic analytical approach and incorporate the different
regulatory procedures of all uses of a given resource in a single
framework (Table 1).
An institutional regime (IR) is defined as encompassing all the
formal rules governing resource uses in a given area. These rules result
from private law (property rights1, contracts, conventions, etc.), as well
as public law (national, regional and municipal laws formulated within
the framework of public policy programs). Their combined effect reg-
ulates the rights to use, manage, access to, inherit, dispose or transfer a
resource. Because of its institutionalized nature, an IR has a stability
guaranteeing regularity and predictability of the modes of regulation of
the resource, as well as decisions and sanctions resulting from its im-
plementation. At the interstices of the formal rules, are informal ar-
rangements such as ad hoc agreements, which are typically dependent
on the social norms and values in a given context (Gerber et al., 2009;
Schweizer, 2015). Together the formal and informal rules govern the
behavior of the owners or users of the resource (or of specific goods and
services provided by it). The IRR framework analyzes and compares the
different configurations of an IR over time and across space, both the-
oretically and empirically, and provides heuristic tools to conceptualize
their effects on the sustainability of a resource. One of the major con-
tributions of the IRR framework is its ability to appraise the institu-
tional complexity of heterogeneous resource use situations at the nexus
of public regulatory actions and private responses, to link the resulting
institutional arrangements with claimants’ access to the resource (Ribot
and Peluso, 2003), and to propose causal mechanisms explaining the
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relationship between institutions and sustainability.
The IRR framework contributes to a broad set of questions on the
institutional and political dimensions of resource governance:
- Political-legal complexity and organisation. The state shapes social
behaviour through institutions (constitutions, public policies and
property rights). They define the organisation of the state, the se-
paration of power and administrative procedures (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1985); they bestow constitutional legitimacy on the in-
stitution of private property (Bromley, 1992; Heinsohn and Steiger,
2009); they impose indicators and standards (Desrosières, 2011).
How does this complex regulatory environment impact on co-
ordination, fit or scale in the governance of resource uses (Varone
et al., 2013; Nahrath and Guerrin this volume)? In light of the
growing complexity of modern public intervention (Weber, 1968),
how can the coherence of the IRR be guaranteed?
- Policy instruments. The selection of policy instruments generates
political activity because public intervention has a redistributive
effect (Hood, 1983; Knoepfel, 1986). Specific policies lead to the use
of a particular set of policy instruments and methods (Salamon,
2000). How do actors use this legal complexity – e.g. through the
strategic selection of instruments, venue shopping or differential
rule activation – to improve their access to specific resources?
- Property. Due to the constitutional guarantee of property, property-
right holders are in a strong position to interfere with the im-
plementation of public policies with a spatial impact (Gerber and
Rissman, 2012; Knoepfel, 2018). Which role does the privileged
position of title holders play in resource management? Under which
conditions do public actors successfully counteract their powerful
resource claims? Which circumstances push the public hand to
(partially) withdraw a resource from the market (privatization vs.
collectivisation, commodification vs. decommodification of re-
sources; Gerber and Gerber, 2017; Vatn, 2018)?
- Use conflicts. As the expression of an ideology, public policies impose
a particular approach to understanding public problems, to framing
the mental interpretation of these problems and to imposing specific
values and representations (Gramsci, 1971; Foucault, 1991; Jobert
and Muller, 1987; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993). Conflicts can
either be appraised as problematic phenomena that threaten social
stability and which must be “resolved”, or they can be seen as
normal phenomena, constitutive of social life (Martinez-Alier, 2002;
Paavola, 2007). This first understanding fosters social engineering
theories on cooperation, concertation and negotiation seeking to
“pacify social relations” (Torre, 2010). The second understanding
insists on the fact that conflicts are generated wherever power al-
location is asymmetric. Is a conflictual resource-use situation the
result of an incoherent IR that can be mitigated through an im-
provement of the coherence of the regime? Or are the conflicts
driven by systemic contradictions – e.g. inherent to capitalistic
modes of production (Harvey, 2007)?
- Self-organization. Actors are not passive toward the role assigned to
them by institutional rules and regulations (Castells, 1983). Top-
down rule-making leads to important differences between formal
rules and real-life implementation (Hupe and Hill, 2020). Places of
informality appear in the gaps left open between formal rules (Roy,
2005). Which resistance strategies – political or collective action,
counter-discourses, “weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1987) – do re-
source users develop? Do actors’ strategies lead to implementation
deficits (due to loopholes) or do they also make it possible for re-
source users to balance contradicting policy incentives through self-
organization (Netting, 1981; Schweizer, 2015; see also Kellner et al,
this volume)? In many resource use situations worldwide, resource
users have also been able to generate robust institutional arrange-
ments through community-based collective action (Ostrom, 1990;
Agrawal, 2001; Cox et al., 2010; Haller et al., 2016). How do IRRs
enable community-based collective action in sustainable ways?
Which informal mechanisms of accountability occur within self-or-
ganized arrangements (Thomann et al., 2018)?
- Transformation toward sustainability. Sustainable development is not
only a discourse mobilized by different public and private actors to
legitimize their actions regarding resources, it is also a set of values
and practices shaping resource uses (Jackson, 2009). How do IRs
evolve over time in connection with the changing – often deterior-
ating – condition of resources (e.g. biodiversity, transportation and
energy infrastructures, affordable housing stocks or climate)? From
a normative perspective, the question remains open as to how an IR
contributing to a more sustainable use of resources could emerge –
or should be designed (Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Rogge and
Reichardt, 2016; Patterson et al., 2017).
This special issue takes stock of and critically reflects on the latest
developments of the IRR framework. In doing so, the central aim is to
open a dialogue between the IRR framework and other analytical fra-
meworks, and wherever possible generate some real cross-fertilization.
This opening of the discussion sheds light on future research paths in
natural resource management. A key rationale of the special issue is to
provide such contributions at a time where the understanding of the
institutional and political dimensions of resource governance is, maybe,
more crucial than ever.
This article starts with a short presentation of the IRR framework
(for more complete overviews, please refer to Gerber et al., 2009;
Knoepfel et al., 2007) along with a brief presentation of the historic
development of the framework. Then we present the different con-
tributions of this special issue and highlight the dialogue that they open
with other frameworks or concepts.
2. The Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) framework in a
nutshell
Classic institutionalism often led to unravelling the functioning of
institutions in a descriptive legalistic language (Thelen, 2003). In con-
trast, the new institutionalist perspective postulates a mutual interac-
tion between actors and institutions; the actors are influenced by rules,
norms and conventions embedded in collective action, while at the
Table 1
Typology of resource use situations based on the example of the forest resource, and relevance of the IRR approach (Knoepfel et al., 2001, p. 16, based on Young,
1992, p. 103).
Number of users Types of use
Homogenous uses: Use of a single good/service Heterogeneous uses: Use of multiple goods and/or services
Single user (or collective group
of users)
“Single use”: exclusive use of a forest by a wood pulp
company to grow timber for paper production
“Multiple use”: forest maintenance by road construction authority targeting
protection against erosion and traffic noise reduction
Multiple users (or groups of
users)
“Common use”: urban forest used as recreation area by
different categories of inhabitants
→ Self-organized Common Pool Resources (CPR) regime
(as described by Ostrom, 1990)
“Joint use”: the Swiss Forest Act defines 3 “forest functions” that forests need to
fulfil: the protective, social and economic functions (Article 1)
→ Institutional Resource Regime (IRR)
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same time the institutions evolve because of the actions and decisions of
the actors (Lowndes, 1996; Koelble, 1995). The IRR framework is in-
terested in political action, which is interpreted as the result of inter-
actions between intentionally acting actors in response to political-legal
institutions. Political-legal institutions, such as public policies, property
rights, the division of competences among political levels, or procedural
rules, are analyzed from the perspective of the constraints and oppor-
tunities they offer to the actors using a specific resource. The IRR ap-
proach has thus complemented (neo)institutionalism in several ways. In
its early days at the turn of this century, IRR applications have relied on
classic institutionalism to analyze in their historical resource screenings
all legal dispositions theoretically affecting resource uses in a given
national setting. In parallel to this in-depth exploration of political-legal
mechanisms in force, following actor-centered forms of institutionalism
such as developed by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) or Scharpf (2000), the
IRR has become increasingly interested in the interplay between in-
stitutions and actors in the management of natural resources.
Scholars have developed the IRR framework to combine two dif-
ferent disciplinary approaches to environmental problems so as to
overcome the reciprocal limits of these approaches (Kissling-Näf and
Varone, 2000; Knoepfel et al., 2001; Varone et al., 2002; Knoepfel et al.,
2007; Gerber et al., 2009; Varone and Nahrath, 2014). On the one hand,
the analysis of the environmental public policies makes it possible to
account for all the complexity of the functioning of the state institu-
tions, but fails to capture the central importance of property rights in
resource regulation and tends to promote a sectoral view of problems.
On the other hand, institutional economics of natural resources puts
property rights in the center of the analysis (in particular the need to
define them clearly), but has major difficulty to capture the complex
role played by the state as a collective actor (Vatn, 2005).
2.1. Institutions, actors and resources
The IRR framework analyses the causal relations between (1) the IR
in force (public policies and property rights), (2) the resource uses of
actors (owners and non-owners) and their appropriation strategies, and
(3) the condition of the resource (Nahrath and Bréthaut, 2016). The
goal of such an approach is to investigate causal links between the
complex institutional contexts typical of Western democracies, user
constellations and the condition of a resource (Fig. 1).
2.1.1. Resources as objects of appropriation strategies
Actors claim access to the goods and services provided by resources.
A resource-centered perspective is based on a constructivist approach: a
resource emerges from a relational process linking an ‘object’ – that can
be material or non-material (water, soil, forest, landscape, air), con-
structed (housing, infrastructure), or social and cultural (know-how,
knowledge) – and an economic, cultural or ecological ‘production
system’ needing these inputs to satisfy human needs (Kébir, 2010).
According to this relational perspective, ‘resources are not auto-
matically viewed as factors with an inherent use-value and pre-
determined application. […] The use-value of a resource depends upon
the social context within which goals and capabilities are shaped’
(Bathelt and Glückler, 2005: 1547).
Even if resources are neither “natural”, nor “given”, they can still be
depleted or polluted, and access to them be confiscated. This is the
reason why uses must be governed, otherwise the resource might lose
its ability to satisfy needs. However, regulations are usually organized
in a sectoral manner (e.g., agricultural policy, mining, transport, en-
ergy, national parks) and not according to resources (land, soil, water,
air). Therefore a resource-based approach calls for a fundamental shift
of perspective – away from a logic based on the control and restriction
of pollutant emissions (management and internalization of negative
externalities) toward a logic based on the balanced management of the
stocks and reproductive capacities of resource systems (Ostrom, 2007,
2009).
2.1.2. Institutions: important determinants of resource uses
Like all institutionalist approaches, the IRR framework understands
that the “rules of the game” are essential to understand how actors use a
resource. In Western democracies, whose legal principles were his-
torically imposed all over the world, the law is the product of a socio-
political compromise – crystalizing in space and time the complex
power relationships shaping our representations of the role of specific
resources in our societies and of the need to regulate their uses. This
compromise is never stable, as laws and regulations are revised, remain
unimplemented, can be diverted or even hijacked. However even in
“weak states”, the formal legal framework provides a reference that
shapes individual actions, even if actors deliberately chose not to play
by the rules (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009; Bayart, 2009). Informal
rules and arrangements appear and thrive in the interstices left between
formal rules (de Buren, 2015). Informal institutions describe actors’
norms and values in a given context and the ensuing generally accepted
rules-in-use (Ostrom, 2005; Thomann et al., 2018).
The IRR approach builds on the empirical observation and political-
juridical theory that not all rules are equal. Formalized rules (legally)
constraining resource uses can be divided into two main categories –
public policies and property rights – which follow divergent objectives
and rely on opposing legitimization logics.
Fig. 1. Three variables: resource, actors, institutions. Source: modified from Kissling-Näf and Varone (2000, p. 238).
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- Public policies aim at solving a public problem recognized as such
by democratic instances (e.g., the parliament) (Knoepfel et al.,
2011a,b). Through public policies, the state receives the power to
regulate the action of those actors who are thought to be at the
source of the problem – in the name of the public interest. Public
policies are regularly revised, not only because the problem they are
targeting constantly evolves, but also because changing majorities
propose alternative solutions to the problem.
- Property rights protect individuals from the state; as such they de-
fend private interests against the (potentially absolutist) action of
the state. Property rights are grounded in the Civil Code (or similar
in common law contexts); they are much more robust and stable
than the rules stemming from public policies (public law).
Empirical evidence reveals that actors who have the choice prefer to
secure their access and use rights through property titles rather than
stipulations stemming from public policies, because the former are
more robust than the latter. Conservation organizations, for instance,
often chose to acquire the land where they want to conserve biodi-
versity rather than to rely on zoning (land-use planning policy) because
property rights are permanent and do not change according to political
majorities (Gerber and Rissman, 2012).
Property rights and public policies created in representative
democracies interact in a dialectical relationship: At the beginning of
the 19th century, Constant (1988) observed that property rights are the
stumbling blocks of a functioning representative democracy. Property
rights make the private appropriation of goods and services provided by
resources possible, as long as public policies do not restrict exclusive
appropriation in the name of the general interest(s). When a public
policy restricts the room for discretion of landowners, it de facto creates
new use rights (sensu lato) in favor of non-owners and therefore has a
redistributive effect.
Obviously, there are other categories of formalized rules. However
constitutional rules, human rights or global conventions (e.g. UN
Convention on Biological Diversity) do not directly shape use rights to
resources, as they first need to be (in some cases transposed and) im-
plemented through national public policies. Many private standards or
certification schemes develop in the shadow of specific public policies
(e.g. when a technical requirement needs to be carried out according to
the “state of the art”), as the state cannot regulate in detail all technical
processes. Some formalized rules also appear outside of public policies,
mostly in the domain of private law. This is the case of contracts be-
tween individuals, internal rules of private organizations (e.g. bylaws of
a cooperative), even agreements between municipalities for the de-
livery of specific services, etc. Private certificates and labels, although
often backed up by the state, are also specific forms of self-organization
that impact resource uses. Depending on their degree of integration in
sectoral public policies, the IRR framework considers these rules as
either part of the regime (through different policy instruments) or of the
Localized Regulatory Arrangement (see §2.4 below).
The IRR framework considers that capturing the interactions among
different public policies (e.g., protection and use policies), among
property rights or between public policies and property rights (e.g.,
land use planning and landownership) is fundamental to understand
resource uses and degradation. For instance, an access right granted to
the housing resource has a fundamentally different scope, longevity and
robustness if it is backed up by a property title inscribed in a land
register (land title, share in a housing cooperative), if it is based on
tenant law (rental contract), social policies (subsidy to pay the rent) or
temporary housing arrangement (contract based on loaning law). These
distinctions are essential to capture patterns of resource uses, resource
exclusive or collective appropriation, or phenomena of exclusion.
Much has been written on the fragmentation of property (through
processes of financialization, securitization of real estate or outsourcing
of resource-consuming productive activities) leading to the extension of
decision chains and the anonymization of ownership (Theurillat et al.,
2016). Nevertheless, even if management responsibilities become di-
luted, property as an institution is as important as ever because it en-
titles the owner to decide about the uses on a specific plot of land and
corresponding resources.
2.1.3. Actors between structure and agency
The IRR framework sees the relationship between institutions and
agency as dialectical. Individuals are shaped by the internalization of
external structures which become “natural” to the individuals; their
action is then the result of the exteriorization of these internalized
frames of reference (Bourdieu, 1979, 1998). Existing (formal and in-
formal) institutions define the field of possibilities of individuals. In-
stitutions are the “conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of
a society. They provide expectations, stability and meaning essential to
human existence and coordination. Institutions regularize life, support
values and protect and produce interests” (Vatn, 2005). Formal in-
stitutions (legally) frame resource users in their activities (e.g. limit the
scope of possible uses). Simultaneously, users can exercise their agency
within this frame of reference and take advantage of the opportunities
granted by those rules.
2.2. Four paths of intervention
The IRR framework identifies four paths of intervention, which in-
fluence the behaviour of resource users (Fig. 2).
The four paths depicted in Fig. 2 can be described as follows:
1 Policies with no impact on the content of use or disposal rights: e.g.,
information campaigns, economic incentives (tax or subsidies).
2 Policies with an impact on the scope and content of use or disposal
rights (e.g., zoning, land readjustment) leading to:
regulation of use rights without infringing on formal ownership:
e.g., limitations on the right to access the land, to emit pollutants, to
build through different command-and-control instruments.
- regulation of disposal rights: prohibition of sale to certain pur-
chasers (e.g., foreigners, non-farmers), etc.
3 Legal redefinition of property rights with an impact on the scope
and content of use or disposal rights: e.g., introduction of tradable
development rights, introduction of condominium ownership in the
Civil Code, new right to expropriate ‘rogue neighbours’, or pre-
emption rights (right of first refusal) granted to municipal autho-
rities.
4 Redistribution of property titles:
- limited and punctual intervention: e.g., formal expropriation, tar-
geted purchase of land,
- radical and profound intervention: privatization or nationalization
(with or without compensation).
Policy interventions with no impact on property rights (e.g., policy
instruments such as incentives) are comparatively easier to get through
a parliament than initiatives aiming to redefine the institutions of
property. In many countries, the definition of property rights hardly
changes over time, because the delicate balance between use value and
financial value of the land is the result of a subtle political-legal com-
promise (Harvey, 2008). Direct redefinition of the structure of dis-
tribution of property rights is rare as well, except in large development
projects that pursue a public interest (e.g., infrastructure development).
2.3. Qualifying the regime in force: extent and coherence
The IRR uses two dimensions to qualify the regime regulating a
given resource: extent and coherence. The extent refers to the number of
uses actually regulated by the regime in force. Regulation tends to
develop as a response to the appearance of conflicts among competing
resource users. For instance, when a new resource – say wind as a
source of energy – is discovered, users appropriate the resource until
J.-D. Gerber, et al. Environmental Science and Policy 112 (2020) 155–163
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their practices come into conflict with other uses – for example, infra-
structure may develop before regulation limits the impact of wind
turbines on scenic landscape through height restriction.
The coherence analyzes the degree to which different regulations are
consistent with each other (see also Bolognesi et al., this volume); for
example, the degree of contradictory incentives that may exist between
different sources of regulation. Internal incoherence refers to incon-
sistency either among public policies (e.g. between protection and use
policies) or among property rights (e.g. between unclearly defined
property titles or between water rights and landownership). External
incoherence refers to inconsistency between property rights and public
policies. For example, in many countries, major external incoherence
characterizes the IRR of the land resource: through stricter zoning
regulations, the land-use planning policy leads to a reduction in the
value of land. Yet because of the constitutional guarantee of property,
the imposition of strict zoning, which is desirable for the sustainable
management of the land resource, is often not possible because the
municipalities in charge of spatial planning do not have sufficient fi-
nancial resources to compensate affected landowners (Varone and
Nahrath, 2014).
Based on these two dimensions – extent and coherence – the IRR
framework formulates a broad overarching hypothesis that has been
empirically verified in a variety of cases (Gerber et al., 2009). Ac-
cording to this central hypothesis, a regime with high extent and coherence
(integrated regime) is more likely to lead to a sustainable use of a given
resource than a complex, simple or inexistent regime (Fig. 3). This in-
tegrated regime is rare in practice. First, the uses of newly discovered
resources are usually not regulated yet (inexistent regime). Then, pre-
liminary regulations of initial uses may be coherent, especially if they
are few (simple regime). However, as state intervention increases,
complex regimes tend to develop due to lack of coordination between
sectoral regulation efforts. Bolognesi & Pflieger (this volume) and Bo-
lognesi and Nahrath (2020) suggest a convincing explanation of such
historical processes in demonstrating how “transversal transaction
costs” (between property rights and public policies) were leading to
“institutional complexity traps”. Today most IRs in established resource
Fig. 2. The behaviour of actors using the re-
source land can legally be constrained by: ①
policies with no impact on the content of use or
disposal rights (e.g., information, incentives),
② policies with an impact on the scope and
content of use or disposal rights (e.g., zoning
regulations), ③ re-definition of property rights
with an impact on the scope and content of use
or disposal rights (e.g., creation of a system of
tradable development rights), ④ redefinition of
the structure of the distribution of property
titles (e.g., expropriation, nationalization)
(following Knoepfel et al., 2003: 54; Doremus,
2003; Gerber et al., 2009). Informal agree-
ments of the LRA are depicted by bidirectional
arrows.
Fig. 3. Typology of Institutional Resource Regimes according to their extent
and coherence. Source: Knoepfel et al. (2001, p. 38).
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systems can be considered as complex.
Extent and coherence can be discussed theoretically when studying
the formal regulations – e.g. such as stipulated in national legislation –
impacting resources uses. However, a more realistic picture results
when analyzing this empirically according to the conflicts that arise in
concrete resource use situations, where informal institutions also play
an important role (de Buren, 2015). In practice, not all incoherence or
low degrees of extent need action. Only those use situations leading to
conflicts and overuse may need regulatory adaptation.
2.4. The localized regulatory arrangement2
In reality, the management of resources depends on the formal rules
of the IRR, but also on what Ostrom describes as “rules-in-use” (2005),
i.e. rules actually devised and implemented by the actors who use the
resource. Within the perimeter of the resource, and in addition to the
acts of implementation of the formal rules of the IRR in force (mainly
produced by higher levels of government), self-organized, more or less
formalized modes of management can be observed. Actors choose de-
liberately to activate (or not) specific rules of the regime in a given
resource system. The combination of formal and informal rules within
the perimeter of a resource constitutes a Localized Regulatory
Arrangement (LRA) (Knoepfel et al., 2011a,b; Schweizer, 2011;
Bréthaut, 2013; de Buren, 2015). LRAs emerge in the interstices left
between formal rules, i.e. not independently of the regime in force, but
in its shadow. LRA can be defined as a set of more or less formal
agreement that regulates resource uses at stake with regards to specific
situations.
When formalized, LRAs usually take the form of contracts. As part of
private law, the law of contracts involves interactions between private
or corporate actors, whereas public law involves interactions between
the state and the general population, with the state using its author-
itative power granted by public policies. Yet public actors can also es-
tablish a private relationship with private or corporate actors, which
also falls within the definition of private law in this particular case. The
rules of a LRA are directly negotiated within the constellation of actors
using the resource. Ad hoc agreements can also appear between users
that are not legally formalized. These agreements can be introduced on
the basis of simple oral exchanges. This is what stakeholders call
“piecemeal management” based mainly on exchanges of good practices
(Bréthaut, 2013). The agreement can become formalized and can be-
come part of the IRR if it leads to a revision of public policies.
In the LRA, the actors concretize and sometimes reinterpret the law
according to local specificities as well as societal norms and values
(Schweizer, 2015; Schweizer et al., 2016). Indeed, the legislation does
not always meet the requirements of local actors faced with the need to
make rapid decisions concerning the management of a resource. The
LRA allows actors to adapt resource management strategies in three
ways: (1) complement existing rules – when the actors innovate to
enrich the legal provisions and improve the coherence of their im-
plementation, (2) circumventing the rules – when the actors voluntarily
decide not to apply the legal provisions, and (3) diverting the rules –
when the actors use legal provisions to achieve a different objective
than originally planned by the law (Bréthaut, 2013; Schweizer, 2015).
2.5. A brief history of the IRR
A project proposal to the Swiss National Science Foundation in 1998
first introduced the notion of IRR.3 Twenty years later, more than a
dozen applications with the Swiss National Science Foundation and
international funding organizations have been conducted and the
number of IRR-related publications is over 150 in half a dozen lan-
guages (see Lieberherr et al., this volume).
Since the late 1970s, environmental policy analysis brought im-
portant innovations to the emerging field of public policy analysis
(Knoepfel et al., 2007). The growing complexity of environmental
policy implementation led researchers to the development of con-
ceptual frameworks, which included non-environmental policies as well
for explaining the so-called “implementation deficits”. In real-life im-
plementation processes environmental issues were often the “losers”
faced with strongly established economic development policies, such as
agricultural, industrial, infrastructural or regional development po-
licies. Inter-policy coordination and cooperation were key concepts
when trying to reconcile environmental concerns and strong non-en-
vironmental policies (Knoepfel, 1995). However, classical environ-
mental policies tend to deal only with the use of the environment as a
sink for pollution, therefore attempting to regulate the emission of
pollutants, but without considering resources as a whole.
A major conceptual shift took place with the Brundtland-Report
(1987) and its call to preserve the reproduction capacity of resources in
order to meet the needs of today’s and future generations. This new way
of formulating environmental issues in terms of resource overuse in-
evitably led to the question of the institutional rules governing actors’
uses that need to be precisely defined and coordinated with one another
in order to guarantee the coexistence of various uses of one and the
same resource. In this sense, the IRR framework was and still is trans-
formative: it aims at promoting a scientific reflection about institutional
rules able to guarantee the sustainable use of resources.4 This resource-
based approach provided potential explanations for so-called im-
plementation deficits in the field of environmental policies. Due to the
strong constitutional protection of the institution of property, property-
based use rights (e.g. landownership, water property titles or conces-
sions) are always stronger than those granted to other actors by public
policies (e.g. biodiversity users, scenic landscapes users).
As it happened within the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005, 2010), the debate on the regulation of
resources started to include all kinds of non-natural resources.5 This
expansion of the research field led to a corresponding enlargement of
the application of the IRR framework to new resources and to focus on
activities, which can involve multiple resources. This expansion
brought new analytical challenges such as multi-level regulation of
resources (Nahrath and Guerrin, this volume) or very sophisticated
contractual elements impacting implementation processes (Nicol, 2012;
Olgiati Pelet, 2011; Condo, 2017; Dussan, 2019; Laesslé, 2016).
Whereas the focus was initially on institutions as independent
variables, notably through the reconstruction of the historical trajec-
tories of the IRRs of various resources (e.g. historical screenings, see
Knoepfel et al., 2001, and Lieberherr et al., this volume), successive
applications of the framework have focused on empirical regimes in
force within resource perimeters. This coheres with the observation in
policy analysis that national regulations are frequently less significant
2 The crystallization of an emerging concept into an accepted denomination
takes time. In this contribution, we use the expression “localized regulatory
arrangement” (LRA) knowing that first attempts to capture this empirical object
called it “rivalries management structure” (Gerber, 2006), “local arrangement”
(Aubin, 2007), “local decision-making arena” (Knoepfel and Gerber, 2008) or
“local regulatory arrangement” (Schweizer, 2015).
3 “Comparative analysis of the genesis and the effects of institutional resource
regimes” (Project N° 1214−55890.98/1), applicants: Knoepfel, Varone and
Kissling-Näf
4 The community’ motivation to push further the concept is based not only on
academic curiosity but also on the political wish to “change the world” towards
more sustainability. This basic conviction is still a key driving force shared by
many members of the community.
5 From 1999 to 2018, the IRR framework was used to analyze following re-
sources (chronological, non-exhaustive list): water, land, forest, air, landscape,
fauna (hunting), road infrastructure, archives infrastructures, housing stocks,
rural spaces, climate, urban services, railway and civil aviation networks in-
frastructure.
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for the explanation of policy outcomes than local policy games, the
results of which are negotiated in arrangements amongst the implied
actors. This shift of focus led to the development of the concept of the
LRA. This focus on the LRA relativized the explanatory capacity of
nationwide IRR and led to the necessity to consider such arrangements
both as dependent (stemming from local policy games in the shadow of
(inter)national components of IRRs) and as independent variables (ex-
plaining the degree of sustainability of the outcomes).
3. Dialogue with other approaches
The main objective of this special issue is to open a dialogue be-
tween the IRR framework and other analytical frameworks, because
progress occurs through the confrontation of ideas (Fig. 4). In this
section, we briefly present the contributions of this special issue and
identify the frameworks that they rely on.
In their article, Kevin Blake, Stéphane Nahrath and Karin Ingold
discuss the reciprocal benefits of a dialogue between the IRR and the
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier,
1993; Sabatier, 1998). While the former convincingly insist on the
importance of formal rules on the regulation of the access to resources
and on their sustainable management, the latter demonstrates how
institutional rules, as well as their strategic mobilization by actors, are
the product of ideas, action resources and political strategies. The ACF
is able to explain how coalitions of actors coalesce around specific
policy belief systems, share action resources and coordinate their ac-
tions in order to attain their political aims. Therefore, the ACF frame-
work provides useful insights into the dynamics and changes of a re-
gime during its lifespan (emergence, implementation, change), the
actors’ objectives and their strategies during implementation processes.
This is a highly innovative contribution, as the IRR literature to date has
not yet drawn on the ACF (compare Fig. 4).
Elke Kellner, Christoph Oberlack and Jean-David Gerber open a
dialogue between the IRR framework and the polycentric governance
approach, which can be linked to the common-pool resource ap-
proaches and the IAD framework in Fig. 4. The article considers the LRA
to often be polycentric, as it refers to the combination of all resource-
specific localized use agreements that emerge through a bottom-up
process under the umbrella of a given IRR. The authors explore how the
degree of polycentricity of the LRA and the governance processes un-
folding within and between LRAs shapes the coordination of resource
uses and of norms regulating resource uses. This article also contributes
to the literature on polycentricity by proposing new ways to oper-
ationalize polycentricity through the IRR. From a transformative re-
search perspective, it highlights the barriers to improved coordination
of water uses in the Alps under climate change.
Highlighting the IRR’s difficulty to conceptualize the multi-scalar
nature of natural resource management and to grasp the political games
linked to the definition of the relevant scale(s) of the IRRs, Stéphane
Nahrath and Joana Guerrin develop the theoretical links between the
IRR framework and the politics of scale (Brenner, 2004). To do so, they
rely on the Functional Regulatory Spaces (FRS) concept (Varone et al.,
2013). This crossfertilization between approaches deepens our under-
standing of issues of scale in (natural) resource regulation by adding
socio-political, institutional and historical depth.
Thomas Bolognesi and Géraldine Pflieger investigate the inter-
linkages between the coherence and extent, thus contributing to ques-
tions of transforming toward sustainability. Using the concepts of in-
stitutional complexity trap (ICT) and transversal transaction costs
(TTC), they enter into dialogue with new institutional economics (NIT)
and show that IRRs tend to fall into an ICT which prevents regime in-
tegration. An ICT is the macro consequence of TTC among public po-
licies and property rights. The article examines TTCs at the micro level,
from the perspective of actors subject to the regulation. This leads to a
typology of TTCs with potential policy implementation, shedding light
onto the debate on integration, siloization and intersectoral issues.
François-Xavier Viallon, Rémi Schweizer and Frédéric Varone
combine two potentially complementary streams of literature: im-
plementation studies and policy instruments attributes. By so doing,
they expand the IRR’s ability to understand how the different paths of
intervention (Fig. 2) are activated and combined on the ground and
contribute to questions on political-legal complexity. This sheds some
light for example on the way actors targeted by regulatory instruments
may react. Their contribution shows how temporary compromises on
the regulation of natural resources exploitation can appear in a given
LRA.
The last article of this special issue, written by Eva Lieberherr,
Manuel Fischer and Amadea Tschannen, takes stock of the studies
conducted to date using the IRR framework and provides a first analysis
of IRR studies over time by showing and discussing how different ele-
ments of the IRR framework are more or less popular in the literature.
This assessment identifies three groups of IRR studies, that is, complex
IRR studies, bottom-up IRR studies, and top-down IRR studies.
4. From basic to transformative research
In conclusion, we argue that one of the strengths of the IRR fra-
mework is its ability to conceptualize institutions in a way that echoes
real-life resource use situations, by taking their complexity into con-
sideration. In opposition to the situations studied by model-oriented
researchers, real-life resource use situations are characterized by het-
erogeneous uses, which the IRR is able to grasp. Among the different
users, there is a fundamental difference between those who secure their
access to the resource with property rights and the others who lack such
Fig. 4. Dialogue between IRR and other ap-
proaches. Through a screening of the IRR lit-
erature (see Lieberherr et al. this volume for the
methods), we see that of the screened 120 IRR
applications 16 have drawn on various ap-
proaches (n = 16). There is a predominance of
LRA and law activation foci in IRR applica-
tions. The reason why the LRA and law acti-
vation strategies were separated from “main-
stream” IRR literature, is that these can be seen
as a new addition to the IRR approach. Within
this screening we also find IRR studies linking
with common-pool resource approaches and
the IAD framework, and to a lesser extent on
New Institutional Economics and Institutional
Economics. This screening shows that IRR fra-
mework’s dialogue with law, political science
and institutional economics.
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rights. By highlighting the importance of property titles, the IRR fra-
mework also invites to reopen the controversial question of land-
ownership and its socio-ecological implications (Marx, 1859; George,
1879; Bernoulli, 1946; Polanyi, 1957).
Because of its practical relevance, the IRR framework has been used
in many consulting assessments, for instance in the field of rural and
urban water management, river renaturalization or underground re-
source regulation. A think tank was also created that commonly relies
on the IRR framework to analyze sustainable resource uses.6
Due to its proximity with the empirical reality, the IRR framework
has been able to open a dialogue between disciplines (in particular law,
political science, institutional economics, geography) and between re-
searchers and practitioners. Among other reasons, this is linked to the
IRR framework’s central hypothesis connecting the regime in force with
sustainability outcomes: one of the central messages of the IRR fra-
mework is that sustainability is an issue of institutional coherence and
extent. Incoherence exacerbates conflicts between competing resource
uses and tends to contribute to resource overuse and degradation
(ecological sustainability). Simultaneously the uneven protection of
users’ interests – some can secure their interests with property titles,
other cannot afford it – constitutes a serious obstacle to more egali-
tarian uses of resources (social sustainability). Incoherence can some-
times be improved in a LRA but, even if resource users are able to self-
organize and develop innovative solutions, power relations engraved in
rules in-force limit available leeway. The IRR framework is thus a
highly useful tool to address core questions about the emergence and
design of a regime that contributes to a more sustainable use of re-
sources, which takes both formal and informal institutions into con-
sideration.
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